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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sonny Rome appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Rome filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for burglary.
(R., pp. 5-11, 25-37.) Two counts relevant to this appeal were that trial counsel was
ineffective for not seeking an aiding and abetting jury instruction (Count VI) and appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of cumulative error (Count X). (R., pp.
31-32, 34-35.)
At the evidentiary hearing on the petition Rome called Jay Logsdon, who had
represented Rome both in the trial and the appeal of the criminal case. (Tr., p. 9, L. 16 –
p. 10, L. 5; p. 23, Ls. 8-10.) Logsdon testified that, “in hindsight” he could have presented
a theory that Rome was an accessory after the fact but that he did not present that theory
or request jury instructions on that theory. (Tr., p. 21, L. 17 – p. 22, L. 3.) Logsdon was
not asked about raising a cumulative error theory on appeal. (Tr., p. 61, Ls. 2-20.)
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing the district court granted a directed
verdict denying Rome post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 102-03; Tr., p. 64, L. 5 – p. 79, L.
3.) The district court found the evidence insufficient as to Count VI, failure to seek an
aiding and abetting instruction, because there was no evidence of deficient performance or
prejudice. (R., pp. 102-03; Tr., p. 58, L. 20 – p. 60, L. 16.) The district court found the
evidence insufficient as to Count X, failure to raise a claim of cumulative error, because
“there is no evidence in this record that appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of
cumulative error.” (Tr., p. 75, L. 15 – p. 76, L. 3.)
1

Rome filed a timely appeal from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 105, 109-11, 121,
123-27.)
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ISSUES
Rome states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Whether the district court erred by not taking judicial notice of the
documents in the underlying criminal case record as requested by
Mr. Rome based on its clearly erroneous determination that he had
not requested it to take judicial notice.

II.

Whether the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Rome’s lesserincluded instruction claim fails to apply the proper standards for
evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at an
evidentiary hearing.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Rome failed to show error in the district court’s grant of a directed verdict on
the basis of failure to support the claims with evidence?
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ARGUMENT
Rome Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Granting A Directed Verdict On
The Basis Of Failure To Support The Claims With Evidence
A.

Introduction
The district court granted the state’s motion for directed verdict on Counts VI and

X for failing to support those claims with evidence. (R., pp. 102-03; Tr., p. 58, L. 20 – p.
60, L. 16; p. 75, L. 15 – p. 76, L. 3.) Rome contends that the district court erred by granting
a directed verdict on Count X on the basis of lack of evidence because he asked the court
to take judicial notice of evidence that would have supported that claim. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 6-9.) He contends the district court applied an erroneous legal standard when it directed
a verdict on Count VI. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-20.) Rome does not, however, apply the
legal standards relevant to review of the granting of a motion for a directed verdict.
Application of the relevant and correct legal standards to the record shows Rome’s claims
of error to be without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
“When reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion for a directed verdict, this

Court applies the same standard the trial court applied when originally ruling on the
motion.” Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 565, 272 P.3d 534, 537 (2012).
“In doing so, this Court exercises free review and does not defer to the findings of the trial
court.” Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333, 335, 79 P.3d 154, 156 (2003).
“This Court must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and
drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there exists
substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury.” Waterman v. Nationwide
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Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667, 672, 201 P.3d 640, 645 (2009). “The ‘substantial evidence’
test does not require the evidence be uncontradicted. It requires only that the evidence be
of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that a
verdict in favor of the party against whom the motion is made is proper.” Gunter v.
Murphy’s Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 27, 105 P.3d 676, 687 (2005) (internal quotations
omitted).

C.

The Record Shows There Is No Substantial Evidence To Support The Claim That
Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Raising A Claim Of Cumulative Error On Appeal
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction

petitioner must prove both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774
P.2d 299, 307 (1989). To show deficient performance a petitioner “must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). The court “must apply a strong presumption” that
counsel’s performance was not deficient. Id. To overcome this presumption the petitioner
must “show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.
Strategic decisions by counsel will not be second-guessed “unless those decisions
are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation.” Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 376, 386
(2004) (citation omitted). Where the claim is that counsel’s performance was deficient for
failing to file a motion, the court employs a two-step process of first determining “whether
or not the motion should have been granted,” and second, if the motion would have been
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granted, “the petitioner is still required to overcome the presumption that the decision not
to file the motion was within the wide range of permissible discretion and trial strategy.”
Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 718, 390 P.3d 439, 444 (2017) (emphasis original,
internal citations and quotations omitted).
“[W]e use the same test to evaluate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on
direct appeal as we use to evaluate ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Dunlap v. State,
159 Idaho 280, 296, 360 P.3d 289, 305 (2015).
In this case there was no evidence that, when making the tactical decision of what
issues to raise on appeal, counsel was ignorant of the law or the record, was inadequately
prepared, or had any other objective shortcoming. To the contrary, the record shows Mr.
Logsdon was asked no questions about not raising a claim of cumulative error on appeal.
(E.g. Tr., p. 61, Ls. 2-20.) There is no evidence in this record that counsel’s performance
was deficient for failure to claim cumulative error.
Nor was there any evidence presented that Rome could have prevailed on an
appellate claim of cumulative error. “The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a
conviction when there is an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might
be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in
contravention of the defendant’s constitutional right to due process.” State v. Draper, 151
Idaho 576, 594, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted). A
necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than
one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Rome presented
no evidence that the court in his appeal found two errors, but that the errors were
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individually harmless. Without evidence of two harmless errors to cumulate, there was no
evidence of deficient performance or prejudice.
On appeal Rome contends the district court should have taken judicial notice of the
evidence that would have supported his claim. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.) He points out
that he asked for judicial notice of certain exhibits in response to the state’s motion for
summary dismissal (Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing R., pp. 49-50, 80)), and included items
he intended to admit by judicial notice at the hearing in his lists of witnesses and exhibits
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing R., pp. 85, 88)). 1 Rome’s claim that he presented sufficient
evidence to avoid a directed verdict by requesting judicial notice at a prior summary
dismissal hearing and mentioning potential exhibits in pre-hearing notices is specious. He
has pointed to nothing in the record suggesting he presented substantial evidence
supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not asserting cumulative error
on appeal.

D.

The Record Shows There Is No Substantial Evidence To Support The Claim That
Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Requesting An Aiding And Abetting Instruction
Rome alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking a “proper” aiding

and abetting jury instruction (Count VI). (R., pp. 31-32.) In Idaho an aider and abettor is
a principal. I.C. § 18-204. The “proper” jury instruction on aiding and abetting is ICJI 311
(the “law makes no distinction” between principals and aider and abettors).

1

Rome

Although there is no legal basis for this Court doing so, the state does not object to this
Court’s consideration of the appellate record from the criminal case, State v. Rome, Docket
No. 43213. It shows that the Idaho Court of Appeals found no error, much less two errors
that were harmless individually. The claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
for failing to claim cumulative error is frivolous and without a good faith basis in fact.
7

presented no evidence of what aiding and abetting instruction was given at trial or how it
was deficient performance or prejudicial to not request a “proper” one.
On appeal Rome contends there was sufficient evidence to support a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek a jury instruction for accessory after the
fact. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-20.) This argument fails because Rome has failed to show
that he raised such a claim in his petition. Even if he had presented evidence of an unpled
claim, such would not show error in granting a directed verdict against him on an unpled
claim.
Even if Rome had made a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
request a jury instruction on accessory after the fact, he presented no substantial evidence
to support such a claim. He did present the testimony of Mr. Logsdon that, “in hindsight,”
he believed he could have argued the theory of accessory after the fact, but that he did not
do so. (Tr., p. 21, L. 17 – p. 22, L. 3.) This is not substantial evidence that counsel’s
decision to not pursue an accessory after the fact theory at trial was the result of an objective
shortcoming or that Rome was prejudiced.
On appeal Rome argues that trial counsel’s “uncontradicted testimony” was
sufficient to meet a burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 10-11.) While it is true that Mr. Logsdon’s testimony is sufficient to establish the facts
he testified to, merely establishing that (a) trial counsel believes in hindsight that he would
have been able to argue for the giving of such an instruction and (b) that he did not do so
does not come close to establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Rome next argues that a district court is statutorily obligated to present a jury
instruction when both requested and supported by evidence. (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)
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First, Mr. Logsdon’s opinion that the evidence supported the giving of an instruction is not
proof that such an instruction would have been given if requested. More importantly,
however, this argument bears little if any relevance to the question of whether counsel was
ineffective for not requesting the instruction. It certainly shows no objective shortcoming
of counsel, and even if the court would have given the instruction there is no evidence that
the jury would have acquitted on the greater charge if only the accessory instruction had
been given.
Rome finally argues that the district court’s reasoning, that the fact of conviction
on the greater offense in combination with the “acquittal first” instruction, is not a legally
valid basis for rejecting his claim of prejudice from lack of an accessory after the fact
instruction. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-20.) This argument is irrelevant insofar as it invites
this Court to review whether the district court employed the correct legal standard.
Powers, 139 Idaho at 335, 79 P.3d at 156 (“this Court exercises free review and does not
defer to the findings of the trial court”). It is also irrelevant insofar as there is no evidence
of deficient performance or prejudice. Regardless of whether the “acquittal first” doctrine
is determinative, there is no evidence of prejudice under any theory.
Rome’s theories of error are all predicated on an incorrect articulation of the
standard of review. Because this Court reviews the directed verdict motion de novo and
without deference, Rome’s arguments that the district court employed incorrect legal
standards, even if true, are irrelevant. Application of the correct legal standards to the
record in this case show no error because Rome failed to support his claims with substantial
evidence.

9

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 5th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of March, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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